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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the accuracy of beliefs about corruption, using data from Indonesian villages.
Specifically, I compare villagers’ stated beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in a road-building
project in their village with a more objective measure of ‘missing expenditures’ in the project, which
I construct by comparing the projects’ official expenditure reports with an independent estimate of
the prices and quantities of inputs used in construction. I find that villagers’ beliefs do contain
information about corruption in the road project, and that villagers are sophisticated enough to
distinguish between corruption in the road project and other types of corruption in the village. The
magnitude of their information, however, is small, in part because officials hide corruption where
it is hardest for villagers to detect. This may limit the effectiveness of grass-roots monitoring of local
officials. I also find evidence of systematic biases in corruption beliefs, particularly when examining
the relationship between corruption and variables correlated with trust. For example, ethnically
heterogeneous villages have higher perceived corruption levels but lower actual levels of missing
expenditures. The findings illustrate the limitations of relying solely on corruption perceptions,
whether in designing anti-corruption policies or in conducting empirical research on corruption.
Benjamin A. Olken
Harvard Society of Fellows




Corruption is thought to be a signi￿cant problem in much of the developing world. Corruption not
only imposes a tax on public services and private sector activity; it also creates potentially severe
e¢ ciency consequences as well (Kreuger 1974, Shleifer and Vishny 1993, Bertrand et. al 2006). Yet
despite the importance of the problem, eliminating corruption has proved di¢ cult in all but a few
developing countries.
One potential reason why corruption is so persistent is that citizens may not have accurate
information about corruption. After all, since corruption is illegal, regularly and directly observing
corrupt activity is almost always impossible. If citizens￿perceptions about corruption are accu-
rate, then the democratic process and grass-roots monitoring can potentially provide incentives for
politicians to limit corruption. If, on the other hand, citizens have little in the way of accurate
information about corrupt activity ￿or even if citizens know about average levels of corruption
but do not know who is corrupt and who is honest ￿then the political process may not provide
su¢ cient incentives to restrain corruption.
The accuracy of corruption perceptions is also important because of their ubiquitous use by
international institutions and academics to measure corrupt activity. For example, corruption
perceptions form the basis of the much-cited cross-country Transparency International Corruption
Index (Lambsdor⁄ 2004) and World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2005), and are
used extensively within countries as well to assess governance at the sub-national level. Perceptions
have also been widely used in academic research on the determinants of corruption.1 Measuring
beliefs about corruption rather than corruption itself skirts the inherent di¢ culties involved in
measuring corruption directly, but raises the question of how those being surveyed form their
beliefs in the ￿rst place, and how accurate those beliefs actually are.
This paper examines the empirical relationship between beliefs about corruption and a more
objective measure of corruption, in the context of a road-building program in rural Indonesia. To
construct an objective measure of corruption, I assembled a team of engineers and surveyors who,
1Prominent papers in this literature include Mauro (1995), Knack and Keefer (1995), LaPorta et al. (1999), and
Treisman (2000). This literature is surveyed in detail in Rose-Ackerman (2004).
1after the roads built by the project were completed, dug core samples in each road to estimate the
quantity of materials used, surveyed local suppliers to estimate prices, and interviewed villagers to
determine the wages paid on the project. From these data, I construct an independent estimate of
the amount each road actually cost to build, and then compare this estimate to what the village
reported it spent on the project on a line-item by line-item basis. The di⁄erence between what the
village claimed the road cost to build and what the engineers estimated it actually cost to build
forms my objective measure of corruption, which I label ￿ missing expenditures.￿To obtain data on
villagers￿beliefs about corruption, in the same set of villages I also conducted a household survey,
in which villagers were asked their beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in the road project.
Using these data, I ￿nd that villagers￿beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in the road
project do contain information about the level of missing expenditures in the project. Moreover,
villagers are sophisticated enough in their beliefs to distinguish between general levels of corruption
in the village and corruption in the particular road project I examine. However, the magnitude of
this information is small: increasing missing expenditures by 10 percent is associated with just a
0.8 percent increase in the probability a villager believes that there is any corruption in the project.
One reason villagers￿information about corruption may be limited is that o¢ cials have multiple
methods of hiding corruption, and choose to hide corruption in the places it is hardest for villagers
to detect. In particular, my analysis suggests that villagers are able to detect marked-up prices,
but appear unable to detect in￿ ated quantities of materials used in the road project. Consistent
with this, the vast majority of corruption in the project occurs by in￿ ating quantities, with almost
no markup of prices on average. The inability of villagers to detect in￿ ated quantities, combined
with the fact that o¢ cials can substitute between hiding corruption as in￿ ated prices or in￿ ated
quantities, suggests that o¢ cials may be strategic in how they hide corruption, and that e⁄ective
monitoring requires specialist auditors who can detect multiple types of corruption.
The fact that the overall correlation between beliefs and missing expenditures is positive, how-
ever, is not su¢ cient to show that the two variables can be used interchangeably as measures of
corruption. In particular, beliefs may be systematically biased. I ￿rst show that, even control-
ling for village ￿xed e⁄ects (and therefore controlling completely ￿ exibly for the actual level of
2corruption in the road) and benchmarking for how respondents answer the corruption question
in other contexts, individual characteristics such as education and gender systematically predict
respondents￿perceptions of corruption in the road project. The fact that characteristics other than
actual corruption systematically predict corruption perceptions suggests that people￿ s perceptions
may be biased.
Just because individual beliefs are biased does not necessarily mean that, in aggregate, corrup-
tion perceptions will give misleading results when investigating the determinants of corruption. To
test for aggregate biases that would a⁄ect inference about the determinants of corruption, I examine
the relationship between the two di⁄erent measures of corruption and a host of village character-
istics. Consistent with other studies, I ￿nd, for example, that increased ethnic heterogeneity is
associated with higher levels of perceived corruption (e.g., Mauro 1995, LaPorta 1999), and that
increased levels of participation in social activities is associated with lower levels of perceived cor-
ruption (e.g., Putnam 1993). But when I examine the relationship between these variables and the
missing expenditures variable, I ￿nd very di⁄erent results ￿ethnic heterogeneity is associated with
lower levels of missing expenditures, and participation in social activities is not correlated with
missing expenditures levels at all.
One explanation for these di⁄erences is that these village characteristics a⁄ect levels of interper-
sonal trust in the village. Low levels of trust may increase people￿ s perceived levels of corruption,
which may cause them to monitor more aggressively, in turn reducing the actual level of corruption.
In fact, I ￿nd suggestive evidence that this is the case ￿villagers in more ethnically heterogeneous
villages are less likely to report trusting their fellow villagers, and more likely to attend project
monitoring meetings, than those in homogeneous villages. These results suggest that when ex-
amining the correlates of corruption, examining perceptions of corruption may lead to misleading
conclusions, particularly when investigating factors related to trust. Instead, more objective meth-
ods of measuring corruption, such as the approach used here (or the related approaches used by
Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003, Reinikka and Svensson 2004, Fisman and Wei 2004, Yang 2004,
Hsieh and Moretti forthcoming, and Olken 2006), may produce more reliable results.
This paper is related to several literatures in economics that seek to characterize the relationship
3between beliefs and reality more generally. For example, there is a large literature examining the
accuracy and potential biases in individuals￿forecasts of their own future retirement decisions,
mortality, and income.2 In the public sphere, several authors have also found that perceptions are
positively correlated with more objective measures of performance, in the very di⁄erent contexts of
international perceptions of bribery (Mocan 2004) and principals evaluating teachers (Jacob and
Lefgren 2005). In the setting closest to that examined here, however, Du￿ o and Topalova (2004)
document that women leaders in Indian villages deliver better public services than male leaders, yet
score worse on measures of citizen satisfaction. Their results, consistent with the results presented
here, suggest that there may be political market failures caused by inaccuracies in public perceptions
about the performance of government o¢ cials.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical setting
and the data used in the paper. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework that illustrates the
relationship between beliefs about corruption and actual corruption and discusses how biases in
perceptions might feed back to a⁄ect actual corruption levels. Section 4 presents the empirical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Setting and Data
2.1 Empirical Setting
The data in this paper come from 477 villages in two of Indonesia￿ s most populous provinces, East
Java and Central Java. The villages in this study were selected because they were about to begin
building small-scale road projects under the auspices of the Kecamatan (Subdistrict) Development
Project, or KDP. KDP is a national government program, funded through a loan from the World
Bank, which ￿nances projects in approximately 15,000 villages throughout Indonesia each year.
The data in this paper were collected between September 2003 and August 2004.
2For example, Bernheim (1989) discusses systematic variability in individual accuracy in forcasting their retirement
dates, Hurd and McGarry (1995) document that individuals with certain observable characteristics are systematically
more likely to over or under-predict their own mortality, Dominitz and Manski (1997) document that individuals can
forcast their expected income, and Bassett and Lumsdaine (1999, 2001) discuss how even controlling for observable
characteristics, some individuals are likely to be over-optimistic accross a wide variety of beliefs whereas others are
systematically over-pessimistic.
4The roads I examine are built of a mixture of rock, sand, and gravel, range in length from
0.5 ￿3 km, and may either run within the village or run from the village to the ￿elds. A typical
road project costs on the order of Rp. 80 million (US$8,800 at the then-current exchange rate).
Under KDP, a village committee receives the funds from the central government, and then procures
materials and hires labor directly, rather than using a contractor as an intermediary. The allocation
to the village is lump-sum, so that the village is the residual claimant. In particular, surplus funds
can be used, with the approval of a village meeting, for additional development projects, rather
than having to be returned to the KDP program. These funds are often supplemented by voluntary
contributions from village residents, primarily in the form of unpaid labor. A series of three village-
level meetings are conducted to monitor the use of funds by the village committee implementing
the project.
Corruption in the village projects can occur in several ways. First, village implementation
teams, potentially working with the village head, may collude with suppliers to in￿ ate either the
prices or the quantities listed on the o¢ cial receipts. Second, members of the implementation team
may manipulate wage payments by in￿ ating the wage rate or the number of workers paid by the
project.
The villages in this study were part of a randomized experiment on reducing corruption,described
in more detail in Olken (2005). Three experimental treatments were conducted in randomly selected
subsets of villages: an increase in the probability of an external government audit of the project,
an increase in the number of invitations distributed to the village meetings regularly held to over-
see use of project funds, and the distribution of anonymous comment forms. All of the empirical
speci￿cations reported below include dummy variables for each of these experimental treatments to
ensure that the e⁄ects reported here are not being driven by these experiments, though the results
below are essentially similar if the experimental dummies are not included. (I discuss the e⁄ects of
the experiments on beliefs about corruption in Section 4.4).
The data used here come from three surveys designed by the author: a household survey,
containing data on household beliefs about corruption in the project; a ￿eld survey, used to measure
missing expenditures in the road project; and a key-informant survey with the village head and
5the head of each hamlet, used to measure village characteristics. In the subsequent subsections,
I describe the two aspects of the data that are the focus of this study ￿the household survey on
corruption perceptions and the ￿eld survey to measure missing expenditures in the road project.
Additional details about the data collected can be found in Appendix B.
2.2 Beliefs about Corruption
Data on beliefs about corruption were obtained from a survey of a strati￿ed random sample of adults
in the village. The survey was conducted between February 2004 - April 2004, when construction
of the road projects was between 80% - 100% complete. The sample includes 3,691 respondents.
The key corruption question I examine is the following: ￿Generally speaking, what is your
opinion of the likelihood of diversions of money / KKN (corruption, collusion, and nepotism)
involving [...],￿where [...] is 1) the President of Indonesia (at the time, Megawati Sukarnoputri),
2) the sta⁄ of the subdistrict o¢ ce (the administrative level above the village), 3) the village head,
4) the village parliament, and 5) the road project. KKN is the Indonesian acronym for corruption,
collusion, and nepotism ￿the catch-all phrase for corruption in Indonesian. Respondents were given
5 possible choices in response ￿none, low, medium, high, and very high. The ￿rst four questions
(from the President to the village parliament) were asked, in that order, in the middle of the 1.5
hour survey; the question about the road project was asked towards the end of the survey.
The tabulations of the responses to this question for corruption involving the road project and,
by way of comparison, the President of Indonesia and the village head, are given in Table 1. Several
things are worth noting about the responses. First, the more ￿ local￿the subject being asked about,
the less corruption respondents report ￿i.e., respondents report the highest corruption levels for
the President, followed by the village head, followed by the road project.
Second, 8.9% of respondents do not answer the question about corruption in the road project,
claiming either they do not know or they do not want to answer. In interviews it appeared that
many people who refused to answer did so because they felt uncomfortable saying that there was
corruption. Although respondents were assured that responses would remain anonymous, this
reluctance to state opinions about corruption is common to many surveys of corruption. It is
6particularly understandable in this context, given that free speech was restricted in Indonesia until
the end of the Soeharto government in 1998, and that even now village heads still wield considerable
local authority.
I therefore examine two versions of the corruption beliefs variable that deal with these non-
responses in di⁄erent ways. The ￿rst version is simply the ￿ve ordered categorical responses shown
in Table 1, where ￿refused to answer￿is treated as missing. I use ordered probit models to inves-
tigate the determinants of this categorical response variable. The disadvantage of this approach is
that it disregards the potentially useful information contained in ￿refused to answer,￿namely that
those who refuse to answer often believe there is corruption but are unwilling to say so. I therefore
create a second version of the beliefs variable called ￿any likelihood of corruption￿that groups all
positive likelihood of corruption answers together with non-responses. This variable is equal to 1 if
the respondent reports any positive probability of corruption (low, medium, high, or very high) or
refused to answer the corruption question, and 0 otherwise.3 I use probit models to investigate the
determinants of this dummy variable. As will be discussed in more detail below, the two variables
produce broadly similar results.
2.3 Missing Expenditures
The objective measure of corruption I use is ￿missing expenditures￿in the road project. Missing
expenditures are the di⁄erence in logs between what the village claimed it spent on the project
and an independent estimate of what it actually spent. This measure is approximately equal to the
percent of the expenditures on the road project that cannot be accounted for by the independent
estimate of expenditures.
Obtaining data on what villages claim they spent is relatively straightforward. At the end
of the project, all village implementation teams were required by KDP to ￿le an accountability
report with the project subdistrict o¢ ce, in which they reported the prices, quantities, and total
expenditure on each type of material and each type of labor (skilled, unskilled, and foreman) used
3Alternatively, if I use a dummy variable for any positive perceptions of corruption, but drop missings rather than
count them as a positive perception, the results are slightly weaker than the results presented. This is consistent with
the idea that a non-response is associated with a positive perceived corruption probability.
7in the project. The total amount reported must match the total amount allocated to the village.
These reports were obtained from the village by the survey team.
Obtaining an independent estimate of what was actually spent was substantially more di¢ cult,
and involved three main activities￿ an engineering survey to determine quantities of materials used,
a worker survey to determine wages paid by the project, and a supplier survey to determine prices
for materials. In the engineering survey, an engineer and an assistant conducted a detailed physical
assessment of all physical infrastructure built by the project in order to obtain an estimate of the
quantity of main materials (rocks, sand, and gravel) used. In particular, to estimate the quantity
of each of these materials used in the road, the engineers dug ten 40cm ￿ 40cm core samples
at randomly selected locations on the road and measured the quantities of each material in each
core sample. By combining the measurements of the volume of each material per square meter
of road with measurements of the total length and average width of the road, I can estimate the
total quantity of materials used in the road. I also conducted calibration exercises to estimate a
￿loss ratio,￿ i.e., the fraction of materials that are typically lost are lost as part of the normal
construction process.4
To measure the quantity of labor, workers were asked which of the many activities involved in
building the road were done with paid labor, voluntary labor, or some combination, what the daily
wage and number of hours worked was, and to describe any piece rate arrangements that may have
been part of the building of the project. To estimate the quantity of person-days actually paid out
by the project, I combine information from the worker survey about the percentage of each task
done with paid labor, information from the engineering survey about the quantity of each task,
and assumptions of worker capacity derived both from the experience of ￿eld engineers and the
experience from building the calibration roads.
To measure prices, a price survey was conducted in each subdistrict. Since there can be sub-
stantial di⁄erences in transportation costs within a subdistrict, surveyors obtained prices for each
4For example, some amount of sand may blow away o⁄ the top of a truck, or may not be totally scooped out of
the hole dug by the engineers conducting the core sample. I estimated the ratio between actual materials used and
the amount of materials measured by the engineering survey by constructing four test roads, where the quantities
of materials were measured both before and after construction. In calculating missing expenditures, I multiply the
estimated actual quantities based on the core samples of the road by this loss ratio to generate the actual estimated
level of expenditures on the road project.
8material that included transportation costs to each survey village. The price survey included sev-
eral types of suppliers￿ supply contractors, construction supply stores, truck drivers (who typically
transport the materials used in the project), and workers at quarries￿ as well recent buyers of
material (primarily workers at construction sites). For each type of material used by the project,
between three and ￿ve independent prices were obtained; I use the median price from the survey
for the analysis.
From these data ￿reported and actual quantities and prices for each of the major items used
in the project ￿I construct the missing expenditures variable. Speci￿cally, I de￿ne the missing
expenditures variable to be the di⁄erence between the log of the reported amount and the log of
the actual amount. As shown in Table 1, on average, after adjusting for the normal loss ratios
derived from the calibration exercise, the mean of the missing expenditures variable is 0:24. Note,
however, that while the levels of the missing expenditures variable depend on the loss ratios, the
di⁄erences in missing expenditures across di⁄erent villages do not.5 As a result, I focus primarily
on the di⁄erences in missing expenditures across villages rather than on the absolute level of missing
expenditures.
3 Theoretical Framework
The empirical analysis will examine the relationship between the two measures of corruption just
described ￿ villagers￿ beliefs about the likelihood of corruption and a more objective measure
of ￿missing expenditures.￿ Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, this section develops a
simple model of corruption beliefs in order to provide a theoretical framework that relates these
two variables. The theoretical framework illustrates two key points. First, the beliefs about the
likelihood of corruption reported in the household survey are an amalgam of respondents￿general
prior beliefs about the likelihood of corruption in the village and any speci￿c information the
respondent has learned about whether corruption actually occurred in this particular project. The
5To see this, note that the loss ratio is a multiplicative constant for each component of the road. If there was only
one type of material used the project, then since missing expenditures is expressed as the di⁄erences in logs, the loss
ratio is simply an additive constant. With multiple components (e.g., rocks, sand, gravel, etc), the additive constant
varies slightly from village, depending on the relative weights of the di⁄erent components in di⁄erent villages. These
di⁄erences are small, however, so that changes in the loss ratios do not substantively a⁄ect the results.
9e¢ cacy of villager monitoring depends on the degree to which villagers have speci￿c information
about a particular project, rather than just a prior. The model shows that, in the presence of
heterogeneity in the prior probability of corruption across villages, one needs to control for priors
in order to determine whether respondents actually have speci￿c information about corruption.
Second, villagers￿beliefs are not only in￿ uenced by actual corruption levels; I show in the
empirical work that they are also in￿ uenced by person-speci￿c biases ￿ i.e., for a given actual
level of corruption, certain types of systematically people are more likely to believe that there is
corruption than others. The model illustrates how an aggregate bias (i.e., a bias held by everyone
in the village) can have a feedback e⁄ect on actual corruption levels. Empirically, these types of
biases suggest that using perceptions to measure corruption can produce systematically misleading
results.
3.1 Model Setup
I assume that there are two actors: a villager and a village head. The model takes place in three
steps. First, the village head decides whether to try to steal or not. Second, the villager receives
a noisy signal about whether or not the village head tried to steal. The signal is accurate with
probability ￿ ￿i.e., if the village head tried to steal the villager receives the signal h with probability
￿ and the signal l with probability 1￿￿, where 1
2 ￿ ￿ < 1; if the village head does not try to steal,
the probabilities are 1￿￿ and ￿, respectively. The villager has a prior belief about the probability
the village head tried to steal, which he updates based on the signal he receives. Third, the villager
can choose whether or not to pay a ￿xed monitoring cost M to determine whether the village head
tried to steal or not. Writing the payo⁄s in the form (village head;villager), the payo⁄s are:
Monitor Don￿ t Monitor
Steal (￿F;￿M) (c;￿￿c)
Don￿ t Steal (0;￿M) (0;0)
where F is the ￿ne imposed if the villager monitors and the village head was trying to steal, c is
the amount stolen, and ￿ is the social loss from theft. I assume that ￿ > 1, so that the socially
10e¢ cient outcome is (Don￿ t Steal, Don￿ t Monitor). I also assume that ￿c > M, so that if the villager
knew for sure that the village head was trying to steal the villager would monitor for sure, and that
F > c, so that the ￿ne imposed if the village head is caught stealing is greater than the bene￿ts to
the village head from corruption.6
3.2 Signal quality and the equilibrium level of corruption
I solve for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). De￿ne q as the equilibrium probability the
village head steals, and de￿ne t (for theft) to be the realization of whether the village head tried
to steal, so that t = 1 with probability q and t = 0 with probability 1 ￿ q. De￿ne mh as the
villager￿ s equilibrium probability of monitoring conditional on receiving the high signal, and ml as
the villager￿ s equilibrium probability of monitoring conditional on receiving the low signal.
What does the villager infer from his signal? De￿ne B to be the villager￿ s posterior beliefs
about the probability that corruption occurred (i.e., his belief that t = 1). Applying Bayes rule,
along with the PBE assumption that the villager￿ s priors must equal the true probability q, yields
the following posterior beliefs B:
P (t = 1 j h) =
q￿
q￿ + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)
(1)
P (t = 1 j l) =
q (1 ￿ ￿)
q (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)￿
(2)
If the signal contains information (i.e., if ￿ > 1
2), then P (t = 1 j h) > P (t = 1 j l).
Under these assumptions, there is no equilibrium where the village head plays a pure strategy.
To see this, note that if the village head always stole, the villagers would always monitor, since
￿c > M, in which case the village head would deviate and not steal. Similarly, if the village head
never stole, the villager would never monitor, in which case the village head would deviate and try
to steal. In equilibrium, then, the village head must be indi⁄erent between stealing and not-stealing.
6This assures that if the villager were to monitor if he received the high signal, and were not to monitor if he
received the low signal, then the village head will choose not to steal. I focus on this case to simplify the algebra and
the presentation, but the qualitative results about the correlation of beliefs and reality presented below go through
if we relax the assumption that F > c.












(See Appendix A for derivation and proofs.) Taking derivatives, one can show that
dq
d￿ < 0, so that
the equilibrium probability of corruption decreases as the quality of the signal improves, illustrating
the potential for feedback between the accuracy of the signal and equilibrium corruption levels.
Since the village head must be indi⁄erent in order to randomize, and since ￿don￿ t steal￿always
yields a payo⁄ of 0, the village head will always expect to receive 0 in equilibrium. This means
that corruption doesn￿ t actually increase the utility of the corrupt actor (the village head) in
equilibrium above what it would be if corruption did not exist; rather, it simply reduces the utility
of the villager. Since both corruption and monitoring decrease as the signal becomes more accurate,
the total expected payo⁄s to the villager rise as the villager obtains better quality information. The
villager therefore gains all of the bene￿ts from increased transparency.
Many of the other comparative statics of the model are intuitive. For example, increasing the
monitoring cost M increases corruption, since it reduces the willingness of the villager to monitor
for a given level of corruption q. For analogous reasons, increasing the cost to the villager of
unmonitored corruption ￿i.e., increasing ￿c ￿decreases corruption. Increasing the ￿ne F does not
reduce corruption; rather, increasing F reduces the monitoring probability mh, as a higher ￿ne
means that the villager can keep the village head indi⁄erent with less frequent monitoring.
3.3 Signal quality and the correlation between beliefs and reality
In the data, we do not observe the villagers￿signals directly; instead, we observe villagers￿stated
posterior beliefs (B), and missing expenditures in the road, which corresponds to an objective
measure of whether theft occurred (t). This section discusses what we can infer about the underlying
signal quality ￿ ￿i.e., how much information villagers actually have ￿from the correlations of B
and t in the data.
Speci￿cally, there are two potential correlations we can observe in the data, the correlation con-
12ditional on the villagers￿priors q, i.e., Corr(B;t j q), and the unconditional correlation, Corr(B;t).
Focusing ￿rst on the conditional correlation Corr(B;t j q), using equations equations (1) and (2)
one can show that:
Corr(B;t j q) =
p
q (q + 2￿ ￿ 2q￿ ￿ 1)
p
(1 ￿ q)(2q￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ q)(q + ￿ ￿ 2q￿)
(4)
If there is heterogeneity in q across villages, then the Corr(B;t j q) we estimate will be the expec-
tation of (4) over the distribution of q in the data.
This conditional correlation Corr(B;t j q) has several intuitive properties. First, one can show
that if 1
2 < ￿ < 1, then Corr(B;t j q) > 0, and if ￿ = 1
2, then Corr(B;t j q) = 0. Therefore,
if the conditional correlation is positive, we can infer that the villager has information about the
occurrence of corruption, i.e., that ￿ > 1
2. Second, the correlation between beliefs and actual
corruption is increasing in the signal quality ￿, i.e.
@ Corr(B;tjq)
@￿ > 0. Therefore, although we cannot
recover the primitive ￿ directly from this correlation without knowing the other parameters of the
model, we can infer that a stronger conditional correlation between beliefs and reality implies that
the villagers receive a more accurate signal about corruption, i.e. there is a greater ￿.
The same properties do not necessarily apply to the unconditional correlation Corr(B;t), how-
ever, if there is heterogeneity across villages in the parameters that determine the equilibrium level
of corruption in the village (q). To take a simple example, suppose ￿ = 1
2, so that the signal contains
no information about the realization of corruption t. In this case, we know that B = q, i.e., within
a given village, beliefs have no information and are equal to the prior probability of corruption q.
Since beliefs are constant, Corr(B;t j q) = 0. But across villages of di⁄erent parameters, beliefs
do contain information ￿beliefs are equal to the prior probability of corruption in the village (q),
and thus will be positively correlated with realized corruption levels. This means that in such a
scenario Corr(B;t) > 0 even though ￿ = 1
2 and Corr(B;t j q) = 0. So it is possible to generate a
positive overall correlation between beliefs and reality even if villagers receive no signal about the
realization of corruption and are simply reporting their priors.
Thus, to separate out whether villagers have speci￿c information about corruption ￿i.e., whether
13￿ > 1
2 and villagers have information about the realization of corruption rather than just its prior
probability ￿it is important in the empirical work to control as best as possible for the villager￿ s
prior beliefs about the overall probability of corruption in his or her village. In the model, the only
sources of heterogeneity in beliefs were due to di⁄erences in the underlying probability of corruption
in the data; in reality, as will be discussed in Section 4.3 below, there may be other individual-
level sources of heterogeneity in beliefs as well. For example, conditional on actual corruption
levels, more highly educated villagers may be more likely to believe there is corruption than less
highly educated villagers. In the empirical work below, I will use the respondent￿ s beliefs about
the probability of corruption involving the President, subdistrict o¢ cials, village head, and village
parliament ￿i.e., general beliefs about corruption in the village but not speci￿cally involving the
road project or the ad-hoc committee elected to oversee it ￿as well as a host of other individual
covariates such as age, gender, and education, to control as ￿ exibly as possible for factors that
would be related to the respondents￿prior beliefs about the probability of corruption q.
3.4 Feedback between biases in beliefs and corruption levels
As just discussed, in practice, the model￿ s assumption that individuals￿beliefs are equal to the
true probability q may not hold in equilibrium. Instead, beliefs may be biased. For example, if
the villager and village head are from di⁄erent ethnic groups, the villager might be prejudiced to
believe that the village head is more likely to steal than he actually is. If these biases exist, they
can feed back to a⁄ect real corruption levels.
To see this, consider the case where the villager is na￿ve and has beliefs p = 0 ￿i.e., he believes
that the village head never steals. Biased beliefs violate the PBE equilibrium requirement that
beliefs must be accurate in equilibrium; I will therefore assume a Bayesian Equilibrium (Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1991) instead, which simply requires that all players choose optimally given their beliefs,
but does not impose any restrictions on the form of those beliefs. However, I assume that the villager
updates his beliefs according to Bayes rule based on the signal he receives and his (inaccurate) prior.
In this case, if p = 0, the villager believes that the village head is always honest, ignores his signal,
and never monitors, so mh = ml = 0 in equilibrium, i.e., there is no monitoring in equilibrium.
14Since the villager never monitors, the village head always steals, so q = 1. Analogously, if the
villager￿ s prior belief is that the village head always steals, i.e. p = 1, then the villager always
monitors and the village head never steals. Given this, factors about the village that create biases
in beliefs ￿ for example, factors that a⁄ect the general level of trust in the village ￿ can have
opposite e⁄ects on beliefs and actual corruption levels.
This simple example assumed that beliefs were constant, and unrelated to equilibrium levels of
corruption. But similar arguments hold for smaller biases as well, and for biases that simply shift
priors from the equilibrium level. Suppose, for example, that the villager￿ s priors are equal to the
true equilibrium probability of corruption q plus a small bias term ", so that the prior p = q + ".












This yields the same result as the more extreme example above ￿the greater the bias in perceptions
", the lower the equilibrium level of corruption. Thus, a level bias ", which does not a⁄ect the
accuracy of the signal ￿ but which simply makes individuals more optimistic or pessimistic about
corruption, can nevertheless also have a feedback e⁄ect to alter the equilibrium level of corruption.
Of course, for this to be sustained over time, the bias must remain despite repeated signals - i.e.,
there must be some reason, such as ethnic prejudice, why beliefs do not adjust in equilibrium.
Whether or not these biases exist will be examined in the empirical work below.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Do individuals have information about corruption?
I begin by estimating whether beliefs contain any information about actual corruption levels ￿i.e.,
whether the unconditional correlation Corr(B;t) is positive. Then, I investigate whether villagers
have speci￿c information about the road project - i.e., in the language of the model, whether ￿ > 1
2
or not ￿by estimating as best as possible the conditional correlation Corr(B;t j q).
15To measure beliefs (B), I consider both versions of the corruption perceptions variable described
above ￿the categorical response variable and a dummy variable for any positive probability of
corruption in the road project (including missings as positive responses). To measure corruption
objectively (t), I use the missing expenditures variable. To investigate whether Corr(B;t) > 0, I
estimate an ordered probit model of the following form:
P(Bvh = j) = ￿
￿









where B is the respondent￿ s answer to the question about perceptions of corruption in the road
project, t is the estimate of missing expenditures in the road project, v represents a village, h
represents a household, j is one of the J categorical answers to the beliefs question, ￿j is a cuto⁄
point estimated by the model (with ￿0 = ￿1 and ￿J = 1), Xvh are dummies for how the household
was sampled, which version of the form the respondent received, and the experimental treatments,
and ￿ is the Normal CDF. The test of whether Corr(B;t) > 0 is a test of whether the coe¢ cient
￿ > 0. For the dummy variable version of the perceptions variable, I estimate the equivalent probit
equation (i.e., with only one threshold level ￿j). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the
subdistrict level, to take into account the fact that there are multiple respondents h in a single
village v and that the missing expenditures variable may be correlated across villages in a given
subdistrict.7
The results are presented in columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 for the categorical and dummy
variables, respectively. Note that to facilitate interpretation, for the probit speci￿cation in column
(4) I present marginal e⁄ects. Both results show a positive coe¢ cient on the missing expenditures
variable, though neither coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant.
A respondent￿ s beliefs about a particular type of corruption may be colored by the respondent￿ s
attitudes about corruption in general. The responses to the beliefs question may also di⁄er if in-
dividuals perceive the levels of the scale (i.e., ￿ none,￿low,￿etc.) di⁄erently. To correct for these
7There are 143 subdistricts in the sample. One subdistrict therefore includes an average of 3.3 villages, so clustering
at the subdistrict is more conservative than clustering at the village level. Clustering at the village level reduces the
standard errors from those presented in the table.
16factors, I benchmark the respondent￿ s attitudes about corruption in general by using the respon-
dent￿ s answer to the question about the likelihood that there is corruption involving the President
of Indonesia. As discussed above, the phrasing of the corruption question is the same as the ques-
tion about the road project, but in this case all respondents are evaluating the same individual ￿
the President of Indonesia. Since the person being evaluated is the same for all respondents, the
di⁄erent answers to this question captures general di⁄erences in the way the respondents evaluate
corruption and answer the perceptions question.8 This is analogous to the approach taken by Bas-
sett and Lumsdaine (1999), who use responses to a question about the probability of the weather
being sunny tomorrow to benchmark the overall optimism or pessimism of the respondents when
interpreting questions about the respondent￿ s beliefs about future events.9
The results, controlling for dummies corresponding to the di⁄erent possible answers to the
question about how corrupt the President is, are presented in columns (2) and (5). Controlling for
perceptions of how corrupt the President is substantially strengthens the results, increasing both
the magnitudes and the statistical signi￿cance in both speci￿cations.10
However, even controlling for the individuals beliefs about how corrupt the President is, it is
possible that the correlation between missing expenditures in the road project and perceptions of
corruption in the road project re￿ ects only villagers￿perceptions of the average levels of corruption
in their village, rather than speci￿c information about the road project per se. In the language of
the model, we have examined the unconditional Corr(B;t) but not the conditional Corr(B;t j q).
8One might be concerned that corruption perceptions of the President may also capture heterogeneity in overall
attitudes towards the President of Indonesia rather than just benchmarking for how the respondent answers the
corruption question. However, controlling for the respondent￿ s overall approval of the President￿ s job performance,
rather than how corrupt they think the President is, has no e⁄ect on the correlation between perceptions of corruption
in the road project and the missing expenditures variable. Conversely, controlling for any of the respondent￿ s other
answers to the corruption question ￿ i.e., perceptions of subdistrict o¢ cials, village head, or village parliament ￿
has a similar e⁄ect to controlling for the corruption of the President, although slightly smaller in magnitude. This
suggests that the e⁄ect of controlling for perceptions of the President￿ s corruption is due to it capturing di⁄erential
interpretations of the corruption question, rather than individual opinions of the President.
9This benchmarking exercise is also related to the anchoring vignettes literature in political science, discussed
by King et al. (2004). The advantage of the approach used here relative to benchmarking against a hypothetical
vignette is that the approach here captures di⁄erences in the respondents￿reluctantance to report corruption (due,
for example, to fear of retaliation), which would not be captured in a hypothetical question.
10A natural question is why controlling for beliefs about the President changes the point estimates on the correlation,
rather than just reduces the standard errors. Returning to the logic of the model in Section 3, if all people in a certain
area believe there is more corruption, they may monitor more, reducing actual corruption levels. This will attenuate
the raw correlation between beliefs and actual corruption unless one also controls for the overall average beliefs about
corruption.
17And, as discussed above, just because the unconditional Corr(B;t) > 0 does not mean that villagers
have speci￿c information about the project (i.e., Corr(B;t) > 0 does not imply that ￿ > 1
2).
To examine whether villagers have speci￿c information about the road project per se, I estimate
an alternative version of equation (6) that also controls as ￿ exibly as possible for villagers￿priors
q:
P(Bvh = j) = ￿
￿









To capture as ￿ exibly as possible the respondents￿priors q, I include in q the respondents￿answers
to the corruption questions about subdistrict o¢ cials, the village head, and the village parliament
(none of whom have any o¢ cial role in the road project), as well as a variety of respondent-level
control variables ￿age, gender, per-capita expenditure (predicted from assets), participation in
social activities, and family relationships to government and project o¢ cials. (The role of these
respondent-level variables in predicting perceptions will be discussed in more detail in Section 4.3
below.) As can be seen in columns (3) and (6) of Table 2, adding these many additional control
variables reduces the standard errors but does not change the point estimates. This is despite
the fact that, to take just one example, the correlation of respondents￿perceptions of corruption
involving the village head and corruption involving the road project is 0.4. Thus, despite the
relatively high correlation of these perceptions of di⁄erent types of corruption, the results suggest
that villagers are actually able to distinguish between general levels of corruption in the village and
corruption in the road project in particular.
To interpret the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients, consider the probit speci￿cation. The
point estimate in column (6) suggests that a 10 percent increase in missing expenditures above the
mean level ￿i.e. an increase of 0.024 from the mean level of 0.24 ￿would be associated with an
increase in the probability the respondent reports any corruption in the project of 0.0030, or an
increase of about 0.8 percent over the mean level of 0.36. Put another way, the ￿elasticity￿of a
respondent reporting any likelihood of corruption with respect to the missing expenditures variable
is about 0.08. Calculating the marginal e⁄ects from the ordered probit speci￿cations give results of
similar magnitudes. While there is information about actual corruption levels in perceptions, the
18magnitude of this information is weak.
An important question is whether this weak correlation is merely the result of measurement
error in the missing expenditures measure, or actually re￿ ects the fact that households have lit-
tle information. Recall that to construct the missing expenditures measure, I used data from 10
core samples of each road, and between 3-5 price quotations for each type of materials used. To
investigate the role of measurement error, for each road I randomly split these 10 core samples
and 3-5 price quotations into two groups of 5 core samples and 1-3 price quotations each, and use
these subsamples of measurements to construct two di⁄erent estimates of missing expenditures for
each village. I then repeat the regressions in Table 2 instrumenting for the measure of missing
expenditure constructed using the ￿rst set of measurements with the measure of missing expendi-
ture constructed using the second set of measurements. When I do this, I ￿nd that the implied
￿elasticity￿increases only slightly, to about 0.085.11 Thus, at least to the extent I can detect it
here, measurement error alone does not seem to explain the low correlation between perceptions
and reality.
4.2 Di⁄erential accuracy: prices vs. quantities
There are multiple methods village o¢ cials can use to hide corruption, and some of these methods
may be easier for villagers to detect than others. In particular, village o¢ cials who steal a given
amount have two options for how to account for this missing money in the accounts ￿they can either
in￿ ate the price paid for the materials procured, or they can in￿ ate the quantities of the materials
procured (or both). To examine how perceptions of corruption are formed, I re-estimate equation
(6) with the missing expenditures variable separated into variables representing its constituent parts
￿￿missing prices￿and ￿missing quantities.￿ Speci￿cally, I de￿ne ￿missing prices￿as the di⁄erence
in logs between the prices reported by the village and the prices measured by the independent survey
team, weighted by the quantities reported by the village; similarly, I de￿ne ￿missing quantities￿as
11In order to do this, I use an instrumental variables linear probability model. For comparison purposes, I ￿rst re-
estimate equation (7) using a OLS linear probability model rather than the probit model used in the text, yielding an
implied ￿elasticity￿of 0.072 rather than the 0.08 from column (6) of Table 2. With the instrumental variables strategy
described in the text, the ￿ elasticity￿increases to 0.085 from 0.072, suggesting that the impact of measurement error
in the quantity and price samples is relatively slight. Of course, there may be other sources of measurement error,
such as in reported expenditures, that are not captured in this methodology.
19the di⁄erence in logs between the quantities reported by the village and the quantities measured by
the independent survey team, weighted by the prices reported. Missing prices therefore captures
markups in prices, while missing quantities captures markups in quantities.
The results are presented in Table 3. All speci￿cations con￿rm that villagers￿perceptions of cor-
ruption in the project are strongly positively correlated with price markups, and only very weakly
(and statistically insigni￿cantly) correlated with markups in quantities. The estimated magni-
tudes for missing prices are approximately double the magnitudes for missing expenditures overall.
Market prices for commodities are commonly known to villagers, but quantities of commodities
delivered are very di¢ cult to estimate without careful measurement, even for trained engineers;
therefore, it is not surprising that villagers are better at detecting marked-up prices than in￿ ated
quantities.
Given this result, it is interesting to compare the overall average levels of the missing prices and
missing quantities variables. After all, if villagers can detect marked-up prices but cannot detect
marked-up quantities, village o¢ cials would in general choose to hide their corruption by in￿ ating
quantities rather than marking up prices. As discussed above, one needs to interpret the levels of
the missing expenditures variables with caution, because the levels of these variables depend on
assumptions about the loss ratios and on the ability of surveyors to obtain exactly the same prices
as the villages procuring the material for the project. Nevertheless, the levels of the missing prices
and quantities variables are precisely what one would expect given the perceptions results: all of
the missing expenditures are hidden by in￿ ating quantities, not by in￿ ating prices. Speci￿cally, as
shown in Table 1, the mean level of the missing quantities variable is 0.24, while the mean level of
the missing prices variable is -0.014, very close to zero.12 Thus, on average the vast majority of the
missing expenditures appears to be occurring exactly where villagers cannot detect it. This raises
the possibility that the relatively low correlation between beliefs and missing expenditures may in
part re￿ ect the strategic behavior of savvy corrupt o¢ cials who deliberately choose the types of
corruption that are hardest to detect.13 It also suggests that there may be limits in the degree to
12Missing prices could be less than 0 if, for example, villages purchasing materials received bulk discounts on
purchase prices that were not o⁄ered to the independent survey team.
13A natural question is how to reconcile the facts that 1) there appears to be no price-markups on average and 2)
villagers are able to detect price-markups. The answer is that the fact that the average price-markup being 0 masks
20which villagers can e⁄ectively monitor corruption, at least in the absence of external help detecting
it.
4.3 Are individuals￿beliefs systematically biased?
As discussed in Section 3.4, if beliefs are biased, these biases can alter the equilibrium level of
corruption. If the extent of these biases vary across villages in systematic ways, they have the
potential to make di⁄erences in beliefs about corruption a systematically unreliable measure of
corruption di⁄erences and the determinants of corruption.
This section tests for whether certain types of individuals are systematically biased in their
beliefs. To do this, I re-estimate a version of equation (7) that includes village ￿xed e⁄ects in
addition to respondent-level variables. Since the actual level of corruption in the road project
does not vary within the village ￿ after all, there is only one road project in each village ￿ if
there are no individual biases, then once village ￿xed e⁄ects are included and once I benchmark
for how respondents perceive the di⁄erent possible answers to the corruption question, none of
the individual characteristics in the regression should systematically predict corruption beliefs. If
they do, then we know that those types of individuals described by the variable in question are
systematically biased either towards ￿nding or not ￿nding corruption in the project.14
Given the incidental parameters problem, rather than estimate an ordered probit or probit
model with a large number of dummy variables, I instead estimate a conditional logit model, which
conditions out the village ￿xed e⁄ect. I therefore focus on the dummy variable version of the
perceptions variable and estimate the conditional ￿xed e⁄ects logit equivalent of equation (7), with
￿xed e⁄ects for each village. In addition, to make the coe¢ cients more easily interpretable, I also
the fact that some villages had higher-than-market prices, and others had lower-than-market prices. Villagers appear
to detect these di⁄erences, and they are correlated with corruption perceptions. Perhaps the village o¢ cials in those
villages where prices were marked-up did not realize that prices would be easier to detect than quantities.
14In interpreting these results, it is important to note that while I can estimate whether bias exists, I do not know
which individuals are ￿ biased￿and which are ￿ unbiased￿ . The reason is that the dependent variable, perceptions of
corruption, does not have a numeric scale that we know should be comparable to the missing expenditures variable.
Thus, unlike the literature evaluating subjective probabilities (e.g., Dominitz and Manski 1997, Hurd and McGarry
2002), I cannot say which individuals are right and which are wrong or whether the perceived level of corruption is
￿right on average￿ ; rather, I can only say that conditional on the actual level of corruption, those with high education
are more likely to report higher levels of corruption than those with low levels of education.
21report the results from estimating an equivalent linear probability model with village ￿xed e⁄ects.15
The results are presented in Table 4. For each speci￿cation (conditional logit or linear proba-
bility model with ￿xed e⁄ects), I present two sets of results ￿one with no additional controls, and
one controlling for perceptions about the President, to control for the fact that some respondents
may have interpreted the multiple response categories di⁄erently from others.
Individual-level biases appear quite signi￿cant. Conditional on village ￿xed e⁄ects, better ed-
ucated respondents and male respondents tend to report more corruption; those who participate
in the types of social activity where the project was likely to be discussed, those who live near the
project, and (naturally) those who are related to the head of the project all tend to report less
corruption.16 Taken together, these individual level biases are highly signi￿cant ￿the p-value from
a joint test of these characteristics is less than 0.01 in all speci￿cations.
Not only are these biases statistically signi￿cant, they are large in magnitude as well. For
example, the results show that each year of education makes an individual between 0.7 and 0.9
percentage points more likely to report corruption in the project. This implies that, holding actual
corruption levels constant, the ￿elasticity￿of the probability of reporting any likelihood of corrup-
tion with respect to the respondent￿ s education is between 0.21 and 0.27 ￿ considerably larger
than the impact of the actual missing expenditures variable discussed above.
The main conclusion from these results is that these individual biases are very substantial,
especially when compared to the magnitude of the correlation between missing expenditures and
beliefs about corruption found above. This suggests that the signal-to-noise ratio in reported beliefs
is quite low, which may also help explain the low overall correlation between beliefs and missing
expenditures.
15I have also estimated a ￿xed-e⁄ects model on a linearized version of the categorical variable, where I assign a value
of 0 to a response of ￿ none￿ , 1 to a response of ￿ low￿ , 2 to a response of ￿ medium￿ , etc. The results are qualitatively
similar to the results presented in Table 4.
16An interesting question is whether these individual characteristics lead to repsondents being more or less accurate
at detecting corruption, not just biased. To examine this, I also interacted each of these individual characteristics
with the missing expenditures variable. Across a wide range of speci￿cations, I found no evidence of such interactions
(results not reported).
224.4 Are aggregate biases substantial?
The previous section showed that certain types of individuals are systematically biased in their
perceptions of corruption. For these biases to feed back to a⁄ect monitoring and, ultimately,
corruption levels, these individual biases would have to be both large and correlated with village
characteristics. If they are, then when examining the determinants of corruption ￿an exercise done
quite frequently in the corruption literature (e.g., LaPorta 1999, Treisman 2000) ￿how corruption
is measured may dramatically a⁄ect the results.
This section examines empirically whether aggregate biases are substantial enough to e⁄ect
qualitative conclusions about the determinants of corruption. In doing this, it is important to note
that I do not necessarily claim a causal interpretation of the relationship between these variables
and corruption; rather, the main question of interest is the consistency of the partial correlations
between these variables and corruption across the various ways of measuring corruption.
To examine whether perceptions can be reliably used as a proxy for missing expenditures, I
estimate the following two regressions via OLS:
e tv = ￿1 + Z0
va2 + "v (8)




and examine the the similarity or di⁄erence between the coe¢ cients ￿2 and ￿2, which capture the
impact of village characteristics Z on missing expenditures and perceived corruption, respectively.
To obtain the most comparable possible coe¢ cients across these very di⁄erent measures, I normalize
all of the corruption measures to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1, so that all coe¢ cients
can be interpreted in terms of standard deviation changes in the corruption measure. I denote the
normalized versions of missing expenditures by e tv and the normalized version of beliefs by e Bvh.17
17For the categorical-response perceptions variable, I impose a linear scale on the variable, and then normalize this
linearized variable to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Although this imposes a linearized form on categorical
response variable, as discussed in footnote 15 above, in other speci￿cations OLS regressions using this linearized
varaible produce qualitatively similar results to the ordered probit speci￿cations, which suggests that the linear
assumptions are not substantially a⁄ecting the resuts. I have also considered ordered probit and probit versions
of equation (9), and they produce qualitatively similar results to those in Table 5 below. Similarly, for the binary
dependent variable, I normalize the variable to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
23That being said, I will focus primarily on those results for which the estimated coe¢ cients ￿2
and ￿2 are of di⁄erent sign, not just of di⁄erent magnitude, so as not to rely too heavily on this
normalization.18
The results are presented in Table 5. Column (1) presents the results when missing expenditures
is the dependent variable, columns (2) and (3) present the result when the scaled linear version of
perceptions is the dependent variable, and columns (4) and (5) present the results when the scaled
dummy version of perceptions is the dependent variable. Columns (2) and (4) do not include the
controls for corruption perceptions of the President, the village head, etc. or the respondent-level
characteristics included in Table 4; columns (3) and (5) do.
The results suggest that for identifying the e⁄ects of basic demographic characteristics, such
as population and education, the results from perceptions (columns 2-5) appear to give similar
results to the more objective missing expenditures measure (column 1). But when considering
characteristics related to trust ￿such as ethnic heterogeneity and social participation ￿examining
the impact on corruption perceptions rather than actual corruption may lead to biased conclusions.
Of particular note are the estimates on ethnic heterogeneity. The cross-country corruption
literature has found that heterogeneity is positively associated with corruption perceptions (e.g.,
Mauro 1995, LaPorta et al 1999). Following the standard approach in the literature, I construct as a
measure of ethnic and religious heterogeneity the probability that two randomly drawn individuals
are from di⁄erent ethnic or religious groups, respectively.19 Consistent with the literature, I ￿nd
18An alternative, equivalent approach which does not rely on these normalizations is as follows. Suppose the true
model of the world is:
tv = ￿1 + Z
0
va2 + "v (10)
Bvh = e ￿1 + Z
0
ve ￿2 + +X
0
vhe ￿3 + e ￿4tv + e ￿
0
v (11)
The coe¢ cient of interest is ￿2, the e⁄ect of village characteristics Z on real corruption levels. In most circumstances,
t is unobserved. If we assume that e ￿2 = 0 (i.e., Zv a⁄ects Bvh only through its e⁄ect on tv), then the estimated
coe¢ cient ￿2 in equation (9) in the text will be equal to ￿2, the coe¢ cient of interest. In the setting here, we
also observe t, so we can estimate (11) directly and test whether e ￿2 = 0 - i.e., we can test directly whether Z has
no direct e⁄ect on perceptions other than through its e⁄ect on the percent missing. This is equivalent to testing
whether ￿2 = ￿2 in equations (8) and (9) in the text. Estimating (11) and testing whether e ￿2 = 0 yields similar
results to those presented in Table 5 and discussed below. In particular, the coe¢ cients e ￿2 in equation (11) are
statistically signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 for the mean village education level, ordinances from village parliament,
social participation, and village ethnic fragmentation.
19Overall, the sample is relatively homogeneous ￿the probability that two individuals in the same village are from
di⁄erent ethnic groups is greater than 0.05 in only 9 percent of villages, and the probability that two individuals in
the same village are from di⁄erent religious groups is greater than 0.05 in only 10 percent of villages.
24that ethnic heterogeneity is associated with greater perceived levels of corruption. Moving from
a village with no ethnic heterogeneity to a village with the maximum ethnic heterogeneity in
the sample (0.51) is associated with an increase of between 0.65 and 1 standard deviations in
the perceived corruption measure, equivalent to an increase of about 50 percentage points in the
probability of reporting positive corruption in the project. Moreover, controlling for the overall
heterogeneity in the village, those respondents whose ethnic group di⁄ered from that of the village
head were 12 percentage points more likely to report positive probability of corruption in the
project. However, when I examine the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the missing
expenditures measure, I get the opposite result ￿moving from a village with no ethnic heterogeneity
to a village with the maximum ethnic heterogeneity in the sample is associated with a decrease
in the percent missing variable of about 0.73 standard deviations.20 The coe¢ cients on religious
fragmentation show a similar pattern ￿a large negative coe¢ cient when missing expenditures is
the dependent variable, and coe¢ cients much closer to zero (and in some cases positive) when
perceptions are the dependent variable ￿ though the results on religious heterogeneity are not
statistically signi￿cant.
One possible explanation for the di⁄erence in the coe¢ cients on ethnic heterogeneity between
perceptions and missing expenditures is that ethnic heterogeneity lowers the level of trust in the
village. Greater suspicions could result in higher perceived levels of corruption, but could also
result in greater monitoring and lower actual corruption, as suggested by the model in Section 3.
In fact, there is suggestive evidence consistent with this explanation. The household survey
asked respondents a version of the World Values Survey trust question, in which respondents were
asked about the degree to which they trust other residents of the village.21 I ￿nd that the villagers in
ethnically heterogeneous villages are less trusting of their fellow villagers than those in homogeneous
villages; on average, 52% of residents in villages with ethnic heterogeneity less than 0.05 reported
20It is worth noting that Glaeser and Saks (2006) also ￿nd that greater racial heterogeneity is associated with
more corruption, even though they examine federal corruption convictions rather than perceptions as the measure of
corruption. However, it is possible that federal corruption prosecutions could be confounded by the same types of
biases, if racial heterogeneity leads to less trust and a greater propensity to demand federal government prosecutions.
21Speci￿cally, they were asked: ￿In general, do you think that other residents of the village can be trusted, or you
have to be careful in dealing with them?￿ The variable is coded 1 if the respondents say they can trust other residents
of the village, and 0 if they say they have to be careful in dealing with them.
25trusting their fellow villagers, whereas only 36% of residents in villages with ethnic heterogeneity
greater than 0.05 reported trusting their fellow co-residents.22
Moreover, there is also evidence that ethnic heterogeneity is correlated with higher monitoring
levels. As discussed above, the prime mechanism for local-level monitoring is the village account-
ability meeting, held three times during the course of the project. In high ethnic heterogeneity
villages (de￿ned similarly using the 0.05 threshold), the number of people who attended these
accountability meetings was 22% higher than in villages with low ethnic heterogeneity.23 This sup-
ports the story suggested by the model ￿lower levels of trust correlated with ethnic heterogeneity
lead to more negative corruption perceptions, which in turn lead to higher levels of monitoring,
lowering actual corruption levels.
A similar e⁄ect ￿ though in the opposite direction ￿ can be seen by looking at the social
participation variables. I de￿ne the intensity of social participation as the average number of times
an adult in the village participated in a social group of any kind in the past 3 months. This
measure is obtained from a census of social groups obtained from the head of each hamlet. As
can be seen in Table 5, increased participation in social groups in the village is associated with
a decrease in perceived corruption levels. This is consistent with the results reported by Putnam
(1993). But when we look at the actual corruption level, we ￿nd, if anything, that increased social
participation is associated with higher measured corruption levels, though the point estimate is
statistically insigni￿cant. This suggests a similar story to the ethnic fragmentation story ￿more
social participation may be associated with increased trust, which both decreases perceptions of
corruption and creates an opportunity for corruption. Similar, though weaker, di⁄erences between
the perceptions variable and missing expenditures appear when we consider a measure of whether
there is a political opposition in the village that could potentially monitor the project ￿the degree
of activeness of the village parliament, or BPD.24
22This di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level if no other village covariates are included. If I re-estimate
a Probit version of equation (8) with this trust variable as the dependent variable and include other covariates, the
coe¢ cient attenuates slightly, and the p-value increases to 0.11.
23This di⁄ernce is statistically signi￿cant at the 1% level. The point estimates are virtually identical if the village-
level characteristics included in Table 5 are included as well (except, obviously, ethnic heterogeneity). Using a linear
ethnic heterogeneity measure, rather than the discrete cuto⁄ for ethnic heterogeneity greater than 0.05, gives very
similar results.
24To measure how active the BPD was, I examine the number of ordinances the BPD had issued in the previous
26Finally, I examine how the experimental results reported in Olken (2005) would have di⁄ered
had the perceptions-based measure been used to evaluate corruption instead of the missing expen-
ditures measure. As described above, there were three experimental interventions in these villages
￿an audit treatment, in which villages were told in advance that they would be audited by the
central government audit agency with probability 1, an invitations treatment, where hundreds of
written invitations were passed out to villagers to attend accountability meetings, and an anony-
mous comment form treatment, where villagers were able to give comments about the project
without fear of retaliation. As can be seen in column (1), the audit intervention was associated
with a statistically signi￿cant reduction in missing expenditures of about 0.3 standard deviations,
whereas the invitations and invitations plus comment forms treatments were associated with a very
small, and statistically insigni￿cant, reduction in the missing expenditures variable. By contrast,
when examining the perceptions variable, the audit treatment has a much smaller (and in most
speci￿cations not statistically signi￿cant) e⁄ect, and the invitations and invitations plus comment
form treatments are associated with increases in the perceptions of corruption, in some cases sta-
tistically signi￿cantly so. One reason for the di⁄erence in the audits results is that, as reported in
Olken (2005), the audits primarily resulted in a reduction in missing quantities, whereas the results
in Table 3 show that villagers are better at detecting missing prices. Also, one can also easily imag-
ine that anonymous comment forms would increase people￿ s beliefs about corruption by providing
information about corruption, while in fact having the opposite e⁄ect on actual corruption levels.
5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between perceptions of corruption and a more objective
measure of corruption, in the context of a road building program in rural Indonesia. After having
developed a theoretical model of corruption perceptions, I showed empirically that villagers￿percep-
tions of corruption do appear to be positively (though weakly) correlated with the more objective
year. Though the BPD coe¢ cients are not separately signi￿cant in either the missing expenditures or perceptions
regressions, the di⁄erence between them appears to be statistically signi￿cant using the method discussed in footnote
18. I also consider another measure of transparency in the project ￿whether a written report of project expenses
was provided at a village accountability meeting ￿though the results are not conclusive in either direction.
27missing expenditures measure. Moreover, villagers appear to be able to distinguish between the
overall probability of corruption in the village and corruption speci￿c to the road project.
Despite this, the magnitude of the correlation between beliefs and missing expenditures is small.
In part, this may be because, on average, almost all of the corruption in the project was hidden by
in￿ ating quantities, which are hard for villagers to detect, rather than marking up prices, which are
easier for villagers to detect. This suggests an important feedback mechanism between transparency
￿which increases the ability of citizens to detect corruption ￿and corruption levels. It also suggests
that, at least in this case, villagers do not currently possess enough capability to detect corruption
to e⁄ectively monitor local o¢ cials, at least without additional external help.
I then examine the extent of biases in corruption perceptions. I show that there are signi￿cant
individual-level biases in how respondents answer the corruption question. Moreover, I present
evidence that for some village level characteristics, particularly those associated with levels of
trust, such as ethnic heterogeneity and social participation, using perceptions to measure corruption
can produce very di⁄erent answers from the results obtained using a more objective measure of
corruption. I present suggestive evidence in favor of the idea developed in the model that biases in
individual￿ s views about corruption can lead to increased monitoring behavior, which in turn reduces
corruption. These results suggest that perceptions data should be used for empirical research on
the determinants of corruption with considerable caution, and that there is little alternative to
continuing to collect more objective measures of corruption, di¢ cult though that may be.
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A Proofs
Proof of PBE equilibrium (equation 3). The ￿rst step is to show that the equilibrium in






, we need to show that the village head is
indi⁄erent between stealing and not stealing. If he does not attempt to steal, he receives a payo⁄
of 0. If he attempts to steal, with probability (1 ￿ ￿)+￿(1 ￿ mh) he is not monitored and receives

















So the village head is indi⁄erent, and therefore does not deviate. Note that this is an equilibrium
only if 0 ￿ mh = c
￿(F+c) ￿ 1, so that mh is a valid probability. This will be the case if c ￿ ￿(F + c),
which is guaranteed by the assumptions that F > c and ￿ ￿ 1
2.
Next, to show that the villager is indi⁄erent, consider ￿rst the case when the villager receives
the high signal. If he monitors , he will receive payo⁄ ￿M for sure. If he does not monitor, he will
receive payo⁄
￿￿cP(t = 1jh) = ￿￿c
q￿

















The villager is therefore indi⁄erent between monitors and not monitors if he receives the high signal.
If he receives the low signal, rational beliefs ensure that his posterior belief about the probability
of corruption is lower, and therefore if he was indi⁄erent between monitoring and not monitoring if
he received the high signal he will strictly prefer not to monitor if he receives the low signal. Note
that the fact that the signal quality ￿ < 1 implies that receiving both the high and low signals are
on the equilibrium path, so beliefs must be rational. This shows that the equilibrium in (3) is in
fact a PBE.
To show that this equilibrium is unique, ￿rst note that if we rewrite the indi⁄erence conditions
(A-1) and (A-2) in terms of unknowns mh and q, respectively, then the solutions for mh and q are
unique. This guarantees the uniqueness of the mixed-strategy equilibrium in (3) among possible
mixed strategy equilibria. The argument for why there are no pure-strategy equilibria is given in
the text, which shows the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Proof that equilibrium probability of monitoring is decreasing in ￿. The equilibrium
monitoring probability can be written as:
q (￿mh + (1 ￿ ￿)ml) + (1 ￿ q)((1 ￿ ￿)mh + ￿ml)
Substituting in the equilibrium levels of q, mh, and ml from equation (3) and simplifying, this
31expression is equal to:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)c2
(￿c￿ + M ￿ 2￿M)(F + c)
The derivative of this expression with respect to ￿ is
￿￿c2 (￿c ￿ M)
(￿c￿ + M ￿ 2￿M)
2 (F + c)
(A-3)
which is less than 0.
Proof of correlation between perceptions and reality (equation 4). By de￿nition,





Since t is a Bernoulli with probability q, E(t) = q and Var(t) = q ￿q2. Since beliefs are correct on
average, E(B) = q. For E(Bt),





q￿ + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
q (1 ￿ ￿)
q (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)￿
￿
= q2 4q￿2 ￿ 4q￿ ￿ 1 + 3￿ + q ￿ 3￿2








2 + (1 ￿ ￿)P(t = 1jl)
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q￿ + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿2
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
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q (1 ￿ ￿)






q (1 ￿ ￿)
q (1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)￿
￿2
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
q￿
q￿ + (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)
￿2!
= q2 4q￿2 ￿ 4q￿ ￿ 1 + 3￿ + q ￿ 3￿2
(2q￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ q)(￿q + 2q￿ ￿ ￿)
Combining terms,

















q (q + 2￿ ￿ 2q￿ ￿ 1)
p
(1 ￿ q)(2q￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ q)(q + ￿ ￿ 2q￿)
To show that equation (4) is well de￿ned, recall from equation (3) that q =
1￿￿
￿c
M ￿+(1￿2￿) in equilib-
rium. Substituting and simplifying yields
Corr(B;t j M;￿;c;￿) =
p
M (M + 2￿c￿ ￿ ￿c ￿ 2￿M)
p
￿c(￿c ￿ M)(￿2￿M + M + ￿c￿2)
(A-4)
We ￿rst need to check that the term under the radical in the denominator is positive. First,
note that ￿c > M by assumption. To show ￿2￿M + M + ￿c￿2 > 0 it is su¢ cient to show that
32￿2￿M+M+M￿2 > 0, i.e. that 1￿2￿+￿2 = (1 ￿ ￿)
2 > 0. To show that (A-4) is positive, we need
to show that (M + 2￿c￿ ￿ ￿c ￿ 2￿M) > 0. This expression can be re-written as (￿c ￿ M)(2￿ ￿ 1),
which is non-negative if ￿ ￿ 1













((1 ￿ q)(2q￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ q)(q + ￿ ￿ 2q￿))(2q￿ + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ q)(q + ￿ ￿ 2q￿)
(A-5)
Note that q +￿￿2q￿ > 0, since ￿ < 1 and q < 1. Note also that 2q￿+1￿￿￿q = 1￿q (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿(1 ￿ q) > 0, since ￿ ￿ 1
2 and q ￿ 1
2 implies that ￿(1 ￿ q) ￿ 1
2 and q (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 1
2, with the




Proof of equilibrium with perception bias " (equation 5). To show that equa-




, by the same analysis as above the village head is indi⁄erent between at-
tempting to steal and not attempting to steal. For the villager, if he receives the high signal he will
be indi⁄erent between monitoring and not monitoring if
￿c
(q + ")￿
(q + ")￿ + (1 ￿ q ￿ ")(1 ￿ ￿)
= M (A-6)
Solving for q yields the expression in (5):Since in the PBE, the villager strictly preferred not
monitoring if he received the low signal, if " is small enough, q + " is close enough to q that he
will still strictly prefer not monitoring if he receives the low signal. This shows that (5) is an
equilibrium.
B Data Details
The original data was collected in 608 total villages. The sample in this paper, however, is limited
to the 477 villages where the missing expenditures variable, described above, could be constructed.
The missing expenditures variable could not be calculated in some villages for one of four reasons:
(1) surveyor error in locating the road, (2) the project consisted largely of a partial rehabilitation
of an existing road, (3) agglomerated expenditures reports (i.e., the village expenditure report
combined expenditures in the road project with other projects that could not be independently
measured, such as a school), or (4) villages that had asphalted the road that refused to let the
engineers break the asphalt to conduct the engineering survey.
The household survey was designed as a strati￿ed random sample, containing between six and
thirteen respondents per village, selected as follows. Two respondents were selected from the
hamlets in which the road was located by ￿rst randomly selecting a hamlet, and then randomly
selecting a neighborhood (RT) in that hamlet. A complete list of households in the RT was
obtained from the neighborhood head, and two households were drawn randomly from that list.
Individual respondents were drawn from the a list of all adults age 18 or over in the selected
households. Two additional respondents were selected from the hamlets in which the road was
not being built using the same procedure. As men in the village tend to participate much more
in road construction activities, the randomization was designed such that, of the four respondents
selected in this manner, three were men and one was a women. In villages receiving the Comment
Form treatment, an additional four respondents were drawn using the same procedure, two from
hamlets with the project and two from hamlets that did not contain the project. Two respondents
33were drawn randomly from the attendance list of Village Meeting II, which was held before the
randomization was announced, and is therefore exogenous with respect to the experiments. Finally,
in some Comment Form villages an additional 3 respondents were added, randomly selected from
the two neighborhoods above (the reasons for this will be discussed below). Each respondent
received compensation of Rp. 10,000 ($1.20), equal to slightly more than half of the typical daily
agricultural wage in the study area.
Given this sample selection, a natural question is whether the sample should be re-weighted
to re￿ ect the fact that di⁄erent respondents had di⁄erent probabilities of being sampled. As is
apparent from the description of the sampling, women were systematically undersampled, and
those who attended a pre-randomization village meeting were systematically oversampled. In all
speci￿cations, I control for how the respondent was sampled (i.e., whether the respondent was
from a hamlet with or without the road project, whether the respondent was selected from the
attendance list at Village Meeting II, and whether the household was one of the 3 additional
households added in the Comment Form villages). The question is whether, given these control
for level di⁄erences among these samples, one needs to reweight to account for treatment e⁄ect
heterogeneity in the relationship between missing expenditures and perceptions. As discussed by
Deaton (1995), weighting the sample makes the point estimates invariant to survey design, but
reduces the e⁄ective power and, in the presence of treatment heterogeneity, does necessarily obtain
consistent estimates for the true average population e⁄ect. Accordingly, the results presented
below in the text are unweighted. Using sample weights in the regressions that account for the
di⁄erential probability of sampling and which weight each village equally (i.e., so that comment
form villages are not over-weighted in the regression) does not substantively change the results,
but not surprisingly it does reduce the statistical signi￿cance of the missing expenditures variable
in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.
Beyond simply measuring perceptions, an additional goal of the survey was to measure how
stated beliefs about corruption change when respondents know that their answers will be used
for monitoring. To examine this, after all corruption questions except for questions involving
corruption in the road project had been asked, a randomly selected subset of respondents in the
Comment Form villages were told that their responses to the questions about corruption in the
project would be used, anonymously, as part of the overall report on the comment forms presented
at the accountability meeting. To simplify exposition, I will refer to this variant of the questionnaire
as Form B, and to the normal questionnaire, in which all questions were explained to be anonymous
and to be used for research purposes only, as Form A. Due to a training error, approximately 60%
of enumerators appear to have given Form B surveys to all households in Comment Form villages.
Therefore, in approximately half of all Comment Form villages, three additional households were
surveyed, drawn randomly from the same neighborhoods as before, two of whom received Form A
and one of whom received Form B. Although the Form B version of the form is similar to Form A
(the coe¢ cient on receiving a Form B form is always very close to 0 and statistically insigni￿cant),
I nevertheless include a dummy variable for which version of the form each household received in all
speci￿cations, as well as dummies for whether the household was sampled as part of this additional
three households per village, in addition for dummies for which experimental treatment the village
was assigned (i.e. comment forms, invitations, or audits). Although I include these dummies in all
speci￿cations in this paper, doing so does not substantially a⁄ect the results.
In addition to the corruption question, the household survey included a wide variety of other
covariates, such as a household roster, education levels, participation in social activities and in the
34road project, assets, and family relationships to various village o¢ cials. To estimate household
expenditure of respondents, I used the 1999 SSD (Hundred Villages Survey), an Indonesian statis-
tics bureau dataset, containing 3,193 rural Javanese households. The SSD asked both a detailed
expenditure questionnaire and the same set of asset questions used in my household survey. In the
SSD, I used OLS to estimate the relationship between log household expenditure and the follow-
ing variables, all of which I observe in my survey: log household size, whether the household was
headed by a woman, the percentage of household members consisting of children ages 0-3, 4-6, 7-9,
10-12, and 13-16, dummies for whether the household has a stove, refrigerator, radio, television,
satellite dish, motorbike, car, and electricity, dummies for ￿ oor type, wall type, and ceiling type,
the total amount of land held by the household, whether the household consumes meat at least once
a week, whether each household member has at least two sets of clothes, whether the household
uses modern medicine when a child is sick. I then used the estimated coe¢ cients from the SSD to
predict household expenditure in my survey. Combined, these 34 variables have an R-squared of
0.58 predicting log household expenditure in the SSD, which suggests that predicted expenditure
is a reasonable approximation for actual expenditure, at least for the purposes used here.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
  
     
Perceived corruption involving:  Road Project  President  Village Head 
None  64.1% 13.9% 47.1% 
Low  21.1% 12.8% 18.0% 
Medium  5.3% 22.9%  9.5% 
High  0.4% 9.2% 1.8% 
Very high  0.2% 3.4% 0.3% 
Refused to answer  8.9% 37.7% 23.3% 
     
Missing expenditures  0.236     
 (0.343)     
Missing prices  -0.014     
 (0.210)     
Missing quantities  0.243     
 (0.320)     
     
Notes: For perceived corruption, the figures given are percentage responses to the question “In general, what is your opinion of 
the likelihood of corruption / KKN (corruption, collusion, nepotism) involving […]?”  where […] is the President of Indonesia 
(Megawati Sukarnoputri), the village head in the respondent’s village, or the road project, as indicated in the columns.  Standard 
deviations in parentheses Sample is limited to those villages where the missing expenditures variable is not missing. Total 
number of observations: 3,691. For missing expenditures, missing prices, and missing quantities, total number of observations: 
477. 
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Table 2: Relationship Between Perceptions and Missing Expenditures 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Likelihood of Corruption 
in Road Project 
(Ordered Probit) 
Any Likelihood of Corruption  
in Road Project  
(Dummy variable 0-1,  
Probit Marginal Effects) 
Missing expenditures  0.186  0.280*  0.307**  0.097  0.119**  0.123*** 
  (0.175) (0.167) (0.135) (0.060) (0.057) (0.047) 
Corruption perceptions of:             
President  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Subdistrict official  No No Yes No No Yes 
Village head  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Village parliament  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Respondent Covariates  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Sample  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3314 3314 2931 3639 3639 3226 
Mean dep. Var        0.36  0.36  0.35 
        
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the subdistrict level. In columns (1) – (3), dependent variable is the categorical responses to the 
perceptions question, i.e., ‘none’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’ and ‘very high’ (in that order). In columns (4) – (6), dependent variable is a dummy that takes 
value 0 if answer was ‘none’ and 1 if answer was ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’, ‘very high’, or if the respondent refused to answer. Corruption perceptions of 
President, Subdistrict Official, Village head, and Village Parliament are dummies for respondent’s perceived corruption levels of the respective officials. 
Respondent covariates are age, education, gender, predicted per-capita expenditure, participation in social activities, relationship to government and project 
officials. Sample controls are dummies for the three experimental interventions (audit, invitations, and invitations + comment forms), dummies for the 
different strata of respondents sampled, and a dummy for which version of the form the respondent received.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Table 3: Accuracy – Prices vs. Quantities 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Likelihood of Corruption 
in Road Project 
(Ordered Probit) 
Any Likelihood of Corruption  
in Road Project  
(Dummy variable 0-1,  
Probit Marginal Effects) 
Missing expenditures – prices  0.433  0.627**  0.669***  0.177*  0.205**  0.204** 
  (0.277) (0.270) (0.251) (0.096) (0.091) (0.081) 
Missing  expenditures  –  quantities  0.057 0.118 0.112 0.049 0.069 0.070 
 (0.183)  (0.177)  (0.155)  (0.062)  (0.060)  (0.053) 
Corruption  perceptions  of:        
President  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Subdistrict official  No No Yes No No Yes 
Village  head  No No Yes No No Yes 
Village  parliament  No No Yes No No Yes 
Respondent  Covariates  No No Yes No No Yes 
Sample  Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  3314 3314 2931 3639 3639 3226 
Mean dep. Var        0.36  0.36  0.35 
        
Notes: See Notes to Table 2.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%                   39
 
Table 4: Are beliefs systematically biased? 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Any Likelihood of Corruption  
in Road Project  
(Conditional Logit) 
Any Likelihood of Corruption  
in Road Project  
(Dummy variable 0-1,  
OLS with fixed effects) 
Education  (years)  0.065*** 0.051*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
  (0.018) (0.019) (0.003) (0.002) 
Age  -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female  -0.183* -0.160  -0.026* -0.022 
  (0.105) (0.108) (0.015) (0.015) 
Predicted  per-capita  consumption  0.217 0.148 0.028 0.021 
  (0.193) (0.199) (0.025) (0.025) 
Participation in social activities  0.013**  0.011*  0.002**  0.002** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
Participation in social activities  -0.075*** -0.069*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
where road project likely discussed  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Lives in project hamlet  -0.781***  -0.764***  -0.110***  -0.106*** 
  (0.108) (0.110) (0.014) (0.013) 
Attended development meeting  -0.312***  -0.320***  -0.042***  -0.042*** 
 (0.110)  (0.112)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Family member of village government  0.043  0.021  0.003  0.001 
 (0.112)  (0.116)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Family member of project leader  -0.399**  -0.402**  -0.051**  -0.051** 
 (0.203)  (0.205)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Sample  controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
President corruption perception   No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  2675 2675 4084 4084 
R-squared     0.47  0.48 
Mean dep. var  0.40  0.40  0.34  0.34 
Fixed  effects  Village Village Village Village 
P-value of joint F-test  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
See Notes to Table 2. Village head corruption perception and president corruption refer to dummies for the respondent’s response to the corruption question about 
village head and President of Indonesia, respectively, as in Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include village fixed effects. Note that the 
sample size is lower in the conditional logit specification since all villages where there is no variation in the dependent variable are automatically dropped from the 
conditional logit model. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  ***  significant  at  1%        
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Table 5: Village Level Differences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Missing 
Expenditures 
Likelihood of Corruption  
in Road Project  
(Linear scale, Std Dev 1) 
Any Likelihood of Corruption  
in Road Project  
(Dummy variable, Std Dev 1) 
Demographics:       
Log population  0.262**  0.174***  0.128**  0.172***  0.118** 
  (0.111) (0.061) (0.055) (0.058) (0.051) 
Mean village education level (years)  -0.039 -0.050 -0.020 -0.047 -0.006 
  (0.046) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) 
Share of population poor  -0.334  -0.146  -0.124  -0.118  -0.065 
 (0.252)  (0.164)  (0.133)  (0.159)  (0.140) 
Social characteristics:       
Ethnic fragmentation  -1.443**  1.733***  1.303***  1.942***  1.477*** 
  (0.567) (0.322) (0.292) (0.340) (0.332) 
Religious fragmentation  -1.359  0.069  -0.324  0.076  -0.309 
  (1.088) (0.732) (0.704) (0.720) (0.700) 
Intensity of social participation  0.024  -0.053*  -0.041  -0.072**  -0.062** 
 (0.064)  (0.029)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.026) 
Transparency:       
Meetings with written accountability  -0.243 -0.017 -0.005 -0.072 -0.079 
report  (0.154) (0.093) (0.074) (0.088) (0.076) 
Number of ordinances from   -0.019  0.008  0.015  0.012  0.015 
village parliament  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Experimental interventions:       
Audit treatment  -0.303**  -0.057  -0.126*  -0.033  -0.068 
  (0.130) (0.087) (0.069) (0.087) (0.071) 
Invitations  treatment  -0.032 0.020 0.024  -0.012 0.019 
  (0.106) (0.077) (0.068) (0.069) (0.064) 
Invitations + comment treatment  -0.021  0.161*  0.120  0.107  0.095 
 (0.094)  (0.088)  (0.073)  (0.087)  (0.077) 
Corruption perceptions of:           
President N/A  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Subdistrict official  N/A No  Yes No  Yes 
Village head  N/A  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Village parliament  N/A  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Respondent Covariates  N/A  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Sample  Controls  N/A Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 445  3074  2731  3384  3011 
R-squared  0.06 0.06 0.22 0.06  0.16 
Dependent variable in column (1) is missing expenditures; dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is the linearized variable of corruption perceptions described 
in the text, and dependent variables in columns (4) and (5) are dummy variables of corruption perceptions. Note that all dependent variables have been rescaled to 
have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Observations in columns (2) – (5) are weighted by the inverse of the number of observations in each village, to ensure that 
each village receives the same weight as in column (1). Estimation is by OLS, though as discussed in the text, estimation of columns (2) and (3) by ordered probit 
and columns (4) and (5) by probit produce qualitatively similar results. Sample controls are as defined in the notes to Table 2; household controls are all of the 
individual respondent-level variables considered in Table 4; village head and President Corruption perception refer to dummies for how the respondent answered 
the corruption questions about the village head and President of Indonesia, respectively, as included in column (3) of  Table 2. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses, adjusted for clustering at subdistrict level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   